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ABSTRACT
Recent discussions in the philosophy of biology have brought into question some fundamental
assumptions regarding evolutionary processes, natural selection in particular. Some authors
argue that natural selection is nothing but a population-level, statistical consequence of lower-
level events (Matthen and Ariew [2002]; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew [2002]). On this view,
natural selection itself does not involve forces. Other authors reject this purely statistical,
population-level account for an individual-level, causal account of natural selection (Bouchard
and Rosenberg [2004]). I argue that each of these positions is right in one way, but wrong in
another; natural selection indeed takes place at the level of populations, but it is a causal process
nonetheless.
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1 Introduction
Recent discussions of natural selection have given conflicting answers to a pair of questions:
First, is natural selection a causal process or is it a purely statistical aggregation? And second, is
natural selection at the population level or at the level of individuals? Denis Walsh, Tim Lewens,
and André Ariew ([2002]) and Mohan Matthen and Ariew ([2002]) (hereafter, when I am
referring to the two papers together, WALM) have argued that natural selection is purely
statistical and on the population level, whereas Frédéric Bouchard and Alex Rosenberg ([2004])
(hereafter, BR) argue that natural selection is causal and on the individual level. In this essay, I
argue for a third logical possibility: natural selection is indeed a causal process, but it operates at
the population level.
The issues at stake in this debate will be fleshed out in more detail in the discussion
below. However, at the outset it is important to distinguish this debate from the more well known
debates over the units (or levels) of selection; unfortunately, similar terminology makes this
distinction difficult. One obvious difference between the debates is that the units of selection
debates assume a causal basis for natural selection, whereas the existence of selection’s causal
basis is one of the points of contention in the debate at hand. With regard to the issue of levels,
however, the difference between the two debates can best be seen by the following example.
Suppose that a person believes, in terms of the levels of selection debate, that selection (either
sometimes or always) acts on organisms. Such a person still might ask whether that selection
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process was acting on individual organisms or populations of organisms.1 It is the latter question
that concerns us here, and indeed, throughout this paper I have, for the sake of simplicity,
assumed organismic selection, although I believe that similar arguments can be made for other
units of selection. Now, it may turn out that the present debate has interesting consequences for
the debates over the units of selection, but I will not explore such consequences here.
Further terminological confusion arises because of the distinction being made between an
individual and a population. Indeed, one might wish to speak of an ‘individual’ population rather
than a class or type of population. However, the reader should understand that, in what follows,
‘individual’ refers to an individual organism, whereas a population refers to a particular
spatiotemporal collection of organisms.
Some philosophers might object to the very idea of population-level causality. In
response to this concern, I will argue in section 2.1 that anyone who accepts the reality of
frequency-dependent selection is already committed to population-level causality. Moreover, in
section 2.2 I will argue that population-level causality is consistent with three commonly
accepted accounts of causality; thus, population-level causality is at least of no more
philosophical concern than they are. Turning to positive support for my claim that natural
selection is a causal process that operates at the level of populations, I will need to make the case
for both natural selection as ‘causal’ and natural selection as ‘population level.’ I will take up the
former issue in section 3 and the latter issue in section 4. Recall, as I noted above, that I agree
with BR, but disagree with WALM, on the question of whether natural selection is causal; thus,
                                                           
1 Frédéric Bouchard ([personal communication]) has suggested that in the units of selection
debate, when someone believes that selection acts on organisms, they believe that it acts on
individual organisms; however, part of my point is that the question at hand, whether individual
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section 3 responds to WALM’s claims.2 On the other hand, I agree with WALM, but disagree
with BR, on the question of whether natural selection is population-level; thus, section 4
responds to BR’s claims. Both sections 3 and 4 involve an examination of Nathan Rank’s and
Elizabeth Dahlhoff’s studies of the montane willow leaf beetle (in particular, Rank [1992],
Dahlhoff and Rank [2000], and Rank and Dahlhoff [2002]), on the assumption that it is
important not only to examine biological theory, but also to consider how that theory is applied
in an actual case.
2 A Brief Justification of Population-Level Causality
Some would argue against the very idea of population-level causality. While I cannot hope to
fully persuade such individuals in a paper of this length–indeed, my response here is at best
partial–my aim in this section is to provide a fuller account of the philosophical arguments that
justify population-level causality for natural selection specifically.
2.1 Frequency-Dependent Selection
Anyone who accepts the full range of processes modeled by population genetics is already forced
to acknowledge at least one instance in which natural selection is a population-level causal
                                                                                                                                                                                             
organisms or populations of organisms are acted upon, has been glossed over in the levels of
selection debate.
2 Others have developed critiques of WALM’s position (see, e.g., Stephens [2004], Rosenberg
and Bouchard [2005], Shapiro and Sober [forthcoming]). Thus, I will focus primarily on arguing
for my alternative position.
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process: frequency-dependent selection.3  Frequency-dependent selection occurs when ‘the
fitness of a genotype (or of an allele) is affected by its frequency within the population’
(Futuyma [1986], p. 166). In some cases, a genotype is fitter when it is rare (negative frequency-
dependence); in other cases, a genotype can be fitter when it is common (positive frequency
dependence). As an example of negative frequency dependence, consider a population in which a
prey species mimics a poisonous organism of a different species (e.g., among butterflies). In such
a situation, being a mimic confers higher fitness when it is rare than when it is common, because
the predator (e.g., a bird) is more easily ‘fooled’ into avoiding the mimic when mimics are rare.
As an example of positive frequency dependence, consider a population where there are different
genotypes, all poisonous, with different coloration patterns. In this case, an organism is fitter if it
is of a common genotype because it is more likely that the predator will have encountered its
type, and thus it will avoid the organism in question. In the discussion that follows, I will focus
on negative frequency-dependence, although the same arguments can be made for positive
frequency-dependence.
Frequency-dependent selection is a clear-cut case of population-level selection because
the outcome of selection (the change in gene or genotype frequencies from one generation to the
next) is determined by a population-level parameter: the frequency of genotypes within a
population. (This will be discussed further below). Consider the case of negative frequency-
dependence discussed in the previous paragraph. In a population with few mimics, mimics will
be favored and thus tend to increase in numbers in subsequent generations, whereas in a
                                                           
3 Two instances, actually: a similar argument can be made for density-dependent selection,
where the fitness of a genotype varies with the size of the population.
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population with many mimics, the number of mimics will increase more slowly, or perhaps even
decrease, in subsequent generations.
Frequency-dependent selection is believed to be quite common; Futuyma ([1986], p. 166)
remarks that ‘it is likely that there is a frequency-dependent component in virtually all selection
that operates in natural populations, for interactions among members of a population affect the
selective advantage of almost all traits, and such interactions usually give rise to frequency-
dependent effects.’ So, at least in this sense, it may be the case that most instances of selection
exhibit population-level causation, and the onus is on anyone who would try to deny the
possibility of population-level causation altogether to produce an explanation for the
phenomenon of frequency-dependent selection. Nonetheless, one still might have questions as to
whether selection more generally exhibits population-level causation; perhaps we can use the
clear-cut case of population-level causation in frequency-dependent selection to illuminate
causation in selection more generally.
My argument here is relatively simple. First, some terminology. A population can be
defined as ‘a group of conspecific organisms that occupy a more or less well defined geographic
region and exhibit reproductive continuity from generation to generation’ (Futuyma [1986], pp.
554-55). Even though a population is composed of individual organisms, it is important to
distinguish between properties that apply to individual organisms and properties that characterize
the relationships among organisms–that is, properties that apply to populations. For example,
individual organisms have properties such as color, shape, and length. Populations, on the other
hand, have properties such as size (defined as the number of individuals), frequency (defined as
the proportion of individuals of one type or another), and growth rate (defined as the rate of
change in the number of individuals in the population). Thus, in a sense, population-level
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properties are properties that arise only given the collection and interaction of individuals.
Nonetheless, a property can apply to a population without applying to the individuals in the
population. For example, the growth rate of a population could be increasing while the growth
rate of an individual organism within the population remains constant (and vice versa).
In pointing out that frequency-dependent selection involving mimicry exhibits causality,
I am implying that ‘C is a (probabilistic) cause of E,’ where C = the frequency of a mimic in a
population and E = a change in frequency of the mimic in subsequent generations. More
specifically, when C = a mimic’s rarity in the population, then E = an increase in the frequency
of mimics in subsequent generations, whereas when C = a mimic’s commonality in the
population, then E = a decrease in the frequency of mimics in subsequent generations.
Furthermore, the reason that frequency-dependent selection involving mimicry exhibits
population-level causality is that the ‘cause,’ the frequency of mimics in the initial population, is
a property of the population. I can see no way to construe mimic frequency, which is the
proportion of mimics to non-mimics in the population, as the property of one individual; it is the
property of all of the individuals taken together (i.e., of the population as a whole). Furthermore,
the ‘effect,’ a change in frequency over subsequent generations, is similarly a property of the
population (rather than the individual)–we are not discussing increases and decreases in
particular individuals, which could mean only their gain or loss of weight. The invocation of
properties of a population as a cause and properties of a population as an effect implies that we
have, in frequency-dependent selection, a case of population-level causation.
In this essay, I will argue that just as frequency-dependent selection invokes population-
level causes and population-level effects, so does selection in general. In particular, in section 4 I
will argue that, for the selection process in general, the ‘cause’ is variation in the
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population–more specifically, heritable differences in physical survival and/or reproductive
abilities–a property of the population rather than of the individual.4 Similarly, I will argue that
the ‘effect’ is differences in reproductive success, a property of the population rather than the
individual. Thus, if one accepts frequency-dependent selection as population-level causation, one
ought to accept selection in general as population-level causation as well.
2.2 Accounts of Causation
But, causation in what sense? One problem that we run into immediately is the well-known lack
of agreement on the nature of causation itself. Yet, I do not think we need to settle this issue
                                                           
4 One might use a similar line of argument to show that selection in general exhibits population-
level causation by claiming that the size of the population, a property of the population, is a
cause involved in the selection process. That is, one might claim that selection predominates in
large populations, whereas drift predominates in small populations. And it is true that with these
phenomena, the size of the population can be said to a play causal role. For example, consider
two populations undergoing random drift in identical environments, where the populations are
identical in their genotype frequencies and differ only in their sizes. In this case, we would
expect greater fluctuations in gene frequencies from one generation to the next in the smaller
population than in the larger (just as small samples tend to be more unrepresentative than large
samples). However, while I think there may be some merit to such an argument (implicit,
perhaps, in a forthcoming article by Reisman and Forber), by focusing on population size it does
not pick out a characteristic that is definitive of selection or drift. (Patrick Forber [personal
communication] tells me that the goal of their essay is to determine the causal influence of
founding population size, and not to define drift). Selection and drift need to be defined as
processes of discriminate and indiscriminate sampling, respectively (Millstein [2002], [2005]),
and discriminate sampling (selection) can occur in small populations, just as indiscriminate
sampling (drift) can occur in large. Moreover, as Stephens emphasizes ([2004], [personal
communication]), we must distinguish the expected outcome of drift from the actual outcome of
drift; the former is solely a function of comparative population size whereas the latter is not.
Even though we always expect a smaller population to exhibit greater fluctuations than a larger
one from one generation to the next, the outcome that in fact occurs may be different (the small
population may exhibit smaller fluctuations than the large from one generation to the next).
(Stephens [2004] says that he is distinguishing between ‘process’ and ‘product,’ but it would
probably be more accurate to say that he is distinguishing between ‘expectation’ and ‘product’).
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here. Selection exhibits population-level causation in accordance with a number of different
accounts of causation. Consider three–a counterfactual account (e.g., Lewis [1973]), a
manipulability account (e.g., Woodward [2003]), and a controlled experiment account (e.g.,
Dupré [1984], Giere [1984]).5 For each of the three cases, C = heritable differences in physical
characteristics (yielding differences in survival and/or reproductive abilities) and E = differences
in reproductive success:
1. Counterfactual account. On a counterfactual account, ‘C is a cause of E’ can be
explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form ‘If C had not occurred, E
would not have occurred.’ Selection supports counterfactuals; if there were no heritable
differences in physical characteristics among the organisms in the population, then there
would be no differences in reproductive success (i.e., there would be nothing to be
selectively favored or disfavored, since all the organisms would be of the same
genotype).
2. Manipulability account. On a manipulability account (in a broad sense), if you can
systematically manipulate C to bring about a change in E, then C is a cause of E. Indeed,
                                                           
5 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. For example, Hitchcock ([1996]) gives an account of
selection and drift in terms of probabilistic causality. Although he does not say so explicitly, in
making a distinction between causation in terms of causal processes and interactions (a position
that Hitchcock attributes to Salmon) and causation in terms of probabilistic causality, Hitchcock
implies that the former applies to the individual level whereas the latter applies to the population
level. Much of what I have said here is congenial to Hitchcock’s account in particular and
probabilistic theories of causality in general, although I have, in contrast with Hitchcock, spoken
of natural selection as a causal process. As I will emphasize, however, this is a population-level
causal process (in the case of selection, a process of discriminate sampling), and so my use of the
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if we were to change the heritable differences in physical characteristics of the organisms
in the population, we would probably change their relative reproductive successes. For
example (and here I use an example that I will develop in more detail below), if we had a
population of beetles that varied in their abilities to withstand hot and cold temperatures
(based on heritable physical characteristics), and we introduced a new beetle genotype
into the population that was able to withstand a greater range of temperatures than any of
the existing genotypes, we would expect that the relative reproductive successes of the
other genotypes would decrease (as a consequence of the success of the new genotype
and the limited resources available for all beetles). 6 Thus, selection satisfies a
manipulability account of causation.
3. Controlled experiment account. On a controlled experiment account, causation is
captured by the conditions of a controlled (in the ideal case, randomized) experiment;
take two populations selected at random and introduce C into one of them. ‘C is a cause
of E’ if the frequency of E is different in the two populations. To use the beetle example
again, imagine two populations of beetles in the same cold environment, where there is a
random distribution of alleles at all loci except for one (or, more plausibly, the two
populations do not differ in the distribution of alleles at other loci). Let us call this one
differing locus the ‘PGI locus.’ In one population, there is polymorphism at the PGI
locus, with the different PGI genotypes differing in their abilities to withstand cold
                                                                                                                                                                                             
term differs from that which Hitchcock attributes to Salmon. (Thanks to Patrick Forber for
directing me to Hitchcock’s essay).
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temperatures. For example, suppose there are three genotypes, PGI 1-1, PGI 1-4, and PGI
4-4, with PGI 1-1 having the greatest ability to withstand cold temperatures. In the
second population, suppose that there is also polymorphism at the PGI locus (I specify
this in order to make the two populations as similar as possible), but that the population
consists of different PGI genotypes that do not differ in their abilities to withstand cold
temperatures. Let us call these genotypes PGI i-i, PGI i-j, and PGI j-j.7 In the first
population, we would expect, over the course of generations, an increase of the PGI 1-1
genotype over the other genotypes, whereas in the second population, we would not
expect a sustained increase of any particular PGI genotype (e.g., an increase of PGI i-i is
just as likely as an increase of PGI j-j, and we will probably see a fluctuation in the two
genotypes over time). Thus, selection satisfies a controlled experiment account of
causation.
Of course, such a short discussion as I have given here cannot hope to be definitive; it is
only meant to show the plausibility of population-level causality for selection. That is, given that
the aforementioned population-level properties embodied by selection satisfy these three well-
known accounts of causation, concerns about the nature of causation, at least, are not reasons to
reject population-level causation in selection. However, a positive account of why we should
accept population-level causation in selection is needed, so let us turn to the first part of my
claim, namely that natural selection is a causal process.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
6 See Reisman and Forber ([forthcoming]) for an argument that drift satisfies the manipulability
condition. Reisman and Forber argue that drift is likewise a population-level causal process;
thus, the present paper is much in sympathy with their conclusions.
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3 The Montane Willow Leaf Beetle: A Causal Story
My discussion of Rank and Dahlhoff’s studies of the montane willow leaf beetle in this section is
meant to illustrate three points: 1) many biologists understand natural selection as a causal
process;8 2) their understanding of natural selection as a causal process affects their methods and
the conclusions that they draw; and 3) that statistical analysis alone is usually insufficient to
demonstrate natural selection (a demonstration of the specific causal process in play is required).
These claims are at odds with those of WALM. For example, Matthen and Ariew
([2002], p. 79) state:
[...] natural selection is a mathematical aggregate of individual events. This seems to
imply that it is not a causally connected process. 9
                                                                                                                                                                                             
7 Whereas the previously named PGI 1-1, PGI 1-4, and PGI 4-4 genotypes are real (and will be
discussed in further detail below), PGI i-i, PGI i-j, and PGI j-j are imaginary.
8 For other arguments supporting the claim that natural selection is a causal process, see Sober
([1984]), Hodge ([1987]), Millstein ([2002]), Stephens ([2004]), and Shapiro and Sober
([forthcoming]).
9 Towards the end of Matthen and Ariew’s essay, there seems to be a relaxation of their claim
that there is a dichotomy between statistical trends and forces; Matthen and Ariew ([2002], p. 82)
‘concede that stochastic causation occurs at the [population] level.’ However, I do not know how
to reconcile this claim with their earlier remarks, and so throughout this essay I will assume that
their position does deny population-level causality. But if I am mistaken in this, our positions
may in fact be closer than it appears initially. Nonetheless, in ‘denying that process causation
occurs at this level’ (Matthen and Ariew [2002], p. 82), Matthen and Ariew seem to be
embracing a concept of process causation that is ‘strictly law governed,’ and admits of no
‘discontinuities’ or ‘reversals’ ([2002], p. 79). (See Stephens [2004] for a critique of this
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Similarly, Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew ([2002], p. 453) assert, ‘Selection and drift are not forces
acting on populations; they are statistical properties of an assemblage of “trial” events: births,
deaths and reproduction.’ I understand both of these papers to be claiming that natural selection
is purely statistical; natural selection, on their view, is a mere statistical summary of lower-level
causes, but it is not itself a cause or a causal process. However, their arguments commit two
mistakes. First, as Stephens ([2004]) has argued, these authors conflate the concept of ‘force’
with the concept of ‘cause.’ At best, they have shown that natural selection is not a force, but this
fails to demonstrate that it is not a causal process. This brings us to the second mistake; because
natural selection is statistical (itself an uncontroversial claim) does not mean that it is purely
statistical. Natural selection can be both statistical and causal, as the following discussion will
show.
The montane willow leaf beetle is indigenous to western North America from the Yukon
to California, and it can be found on willow shrubs or trees that commonly grow in separated
patches of boggy or moist habitats (Rank [1992]). It can fly, but it rarely does so; thus, there is
limited migration between localities. Because of the patchiness of the beetle’s habitat and the
limited migration between patches, there is the potential for adaptation to local microclimates.
Thus, in each of the studies of the montane willow leaf beetle that I will discuss here, samples of
the beetle have been taken from different locations. In an early study, Nathan Rank collected
beetles from three different drainages in the eastern Sierra Nevada mountains: Rock Creek
(northernmost), Bishop Creek (central), and Big Pine Creek (southernmost). Using gel
electrophoresis, Rank first screened twenty-two enzyme loci and found polymorphism among
                                                                                                                                                                                             
position). Instead, I favor accounts of causal processes that allow for probabilistic causation; the
accounts described above are at a minimum amenable to this sort of interpretation.
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five of them. Then, for each of the five loci, Rank measured the amount of differentiation among
the three localities, and found that one locus, phosphoglucose isomerase (PGI), showed
differentiation among the three drainages that was ten times greater than the differentiation at the
other loci. In addition, there was a striking pattern to the differentiation at the PGI locus. The
allele that was the most common in Rock Creek was the least common in Big Pine Creek, and
vice versa: the allele that was the least common in Rock Creek was the most common in Big
Pine Creek.
Rank states that his statistical analysis ‘suggests’ that the PGI locus was undergoing
natural selection, but his claim for natural selection is no more conclusive than that. Perhaps this
is because, as he states at the outset: ‘Even in the absence of selection, genetic drift among small-
sized populations increases their likelihood of becoming genetically differentiated’ (Rank
[1992], p. 1097).
I would argue that Rank’s suggestion–that the population is undergoing natural selection
at the PGI locus–is justified. Why should the genetic differentiation be greater at one locus than
at any other locus? One likely explanation seems to be that whereas the alleles at the other loci
are drifting, producing relatively low amounts of differentiation, at the PGI locus selection is
increasing favored genotypes, depending on the locale.10 The fact that the allele that is
                                                           
10 Ben Jantzen ([personal communication]) has suggested that selection at the PGI locus is not
necessarily the best explanation for the statistical pattern; the loci with little differentiation could
be the result of selection (presumably directional selection that has driven the alleles in question
to fixation), whereas the more polymorphic locus could result from drift in the absence of
selection. This is a fair point. Rank does not elaborate here, but he does cite Slatkin ([1987]) in
this context, and Slatkin emphasizes that whether drift leads to differentiation depends on the
population size and gene flow (migration). Slatkin argues that for a given population, when you
have a number of loci with low differentiation, this is an indication that gene flow is high enough
to counteract drift; thus, if there is one locus with significant differentiation, it must be the result
of a process that can overcome gene flow (i.e., selection). In any case, if it did turn out that
Millstein, p. of 15 of  41
predominant in the north is the one that is rare in the south (and vice versa) is further support for
a hypothesis of natural selection. Perhaps some of the PGI genotypes are better adapted to the
northern location and others are better adapted to the southern. Perhaps, as Rank speculates, it
has something to do with differing temperatures.
However, the tentativeness of his suggestion is also justified. This is because such
speculations, no matter how reasonable, are far from conclusive. As Rank states, the results that
he observed could be due to drift. In other words, they could be due to an indiscriminate
sampling process (Beatty [1984]), a process whereby physical differences between organisms are
causally irrelevant to differences in reproductive success (Millstein [2002]). The population that
survives to reproduce is always but a subset of the population that is born, and the smaller that
subset (or ‘sample’), the more likely it is that it is unrepresentative. If by chance this sampling
process at the PGI locus has occurred differently in the north than it has in the south, then
differentiation would be the result. Rank’s statistics suggest selection at the PGI locus, but they
could be the result of drift. That is to say, the different processes of selection and drift can
produce the same outcome (Millstein [2002], [2005]), the outcome in this case being the same
pattern of differentiation among populations.11
Of course, observing the populations over a number of generations might provide more
definitive statistical evidence for natural selection. However, besides being costly and time-
consuming, such studies are not always as illuminating as one might hope. Fluctuations in gene
frequencies from one generation to the next might look like the result of drift, yet be the result of
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Rank’s initial selection hypothesis is not the most likely hypothesis, that lends even more weight
to my subsequent point that the statistical analysis alone is insufficient and that one must have an
understanding of the causal influences on the population.
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selection in a fluctuating environment. (Again, the different processes of selection and drift can
produce the same outcome). When the environment fluctuates, genotypes that were previously
favored may no longer be favored, and vice versa, producing a fluctuation in gene frequencies
over time that mimics the effects of drift. On the other hand, continued increase of a favored
genotype might look like the result of natural selection, yet be the less likely (but not
improbable) result of drift. Just as a series of fair coin tosses may turn up mostly heads, so may
drift produce a ‘streak of good luck’ for one type over the others (Millstein [2000]).
As biologist Ward Watt has documented, much of the debate concerning the prevalence
of selection versus the prevalence of drift (one aspect of the so-called ‘neutralist-selectionist’
debate) centered over allozymes (forms of an enzyme encoded by different alleles), and indeed,
allozymes are the focus of Rank’s study, as I will explain below. However, Watt ([1995], p. 873)
states: ‘It soon became clear that, given feasible sample sizes, even quite different models of
allozyme variation could not be resolved with any statistical power.’ As a result of this failure,
Watt throws down a gauntlet: ‘Evolutionary biologists are challenged to bring mechanistic
biology into Darwinian context, to move beyond the remains of the “neutralist-selectionist”
controversy and of purely formal approaches to evolution, to seek biologically based generalities
about the evolutionary process’ ([1995], p. 869). Watt urges biologists to seek the causal basis
for claims about selection, and in this way provide a more solid basis than the statistical analysis
of population genetics alone can provide. In this context, he discusses Rank’s ([1992]) study of
the montane leaf beetle in particular:
                                                                                                                                                                                             
11 I use the terms ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ rather than the more common ‘process’ and ‘product’
to avoid the teleological implications of the term ‘product.’
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‘Rank (1992)…found substantial local allozyme frequency differentiation, even among
adjacent drainages in the same mountain range. Rank’s results could be due to local drift,
local microhabitat specialization, or a combination, subject to further study–though gene-
specific variation in the extent of frequency differences led him to postulate local
selection, at least on the PGI gene. In [Rank 1992 and a similar study by Costa and Ross
1994], use of allozymes to probe population structure has ruled out some possibilities,
while leaving the need for further specific work to distinguish among other causal
scenarios - as the authors have been careful to state’ (Watt [1995], p. 878; emphasis
added).
I mention these quotations from Watt’s essay not to make an argument from authority, but to
illustrate that my claim that natural selection is a causal process is consistent with at least some
biological practice (showing the role that natural selection as a causal process plays in their
beliefs, in their methods, and in the conclusions drawn).12 Indeed, Watt ([1994], [1995])
documents a number of recent studies that probe the causal (or ‘mechanistic’) basis for claims
                                                           
12 Chris Stephens ([personal communication]) has suggested to me that a less ‘naturalistic’
philosopher–perhaps even some of the philosophers to whom I am responding in this
section–might accept that causality played a role in biological practice and yet not be convinced
on the metaphysical point about the role of causality in selection. Here my response is two-fold:
1) WALM make ample use of coin tosses in their arguments. I would think that biological
practice is more relevant to conclusions about selection and drift than coin tosses, which are a
very poor model for selection. Coin tosses involve only two ‘types’ (heads or tails)–a point
whose relevance I will demonstrate below–and there is no reproduction involved; moreover, the
very concept of ‘selecting’ is virtually absent. The idea of selecting balls from an urn that
biologists use, where the balls can vary in their color or other attributes, is also imperfect (it too
lacks a reproductive aspect), but it is preferable. 2) Although the appeal to biological practice is
part of my argument in this section, it is not intended to be the sole part. As I discuss in
subsequent paragraphs, statistics alone fail to capture important facts about the biological
population.
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concerning natural selection, and an even greater number of such causal studies are documented
in John Gillespie’s ([1991]) The Causes of Molecular Evolution. Many biologists see such
studies as necessary, and for good reason. Statistical analysis alone (an analysis of outcomes) is
usually inadequate to answer the questions posed.
In fact, in subsequent studies Rank and his colleague Elizabeth Dahlhoff have sought out
a causal basis for the distribution of beetles between the three drainage areas.13 Rank and
Dahlhoff do, of course, collect more statistical data, and they find that the distribution pattern of
PGI genotypes that was present in the earlier study (performed in 1988) is similar to the
distribution of PGI genotypes in a later study (performed in 1996). In fact, there were increases
in the previously favored genotypes, further strengthening the claim for natural selection
(Dahlhoff and Rank [2000], Rank and Dahlhoff [2002]). However, most of their recent efforts
have gone towards establishing the causal basis of selection at the PGI locus. Rock Creek, the
northernmost drainage, is at a higher elevation and cooler than the other drainages, whereas Big
Pine Creek, the southernmost drainage, is at a lower elevation and warmer than the other
drainages. PGI 1-1, a homozygote, is common at the former, but rare at the latter; PGI 4-4,
another homozygote, is common at the latter but rare at the former. Bishop Creek is intermediate
between the two in terms of elevation and average temperatures, and there, a third PGI genotype
predominates: the heterozygote PGI 1-4 (followed by PGI 1-1, then PGI 4-4).
These differences in genotype distribution and temperature are paralleled by differences
in the amounts of heat shock protein produced by the different PGI genotypes. Heat shock
                                                           
13 According to Nathan Rank ([personal communication]), he and Elizabeth Dahlhoff see
themselves as part of a research program whose approach is similar to that described by Feder
and Watt ([1992]). This approach looks at the functional and physiological consequences of
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proteins protect other proteins from heat-related damage ‘by refolding partially unfolded proteins
into their functional state’ (Dahlhoff and Rank [2000], p. 10056), but they also appear to enhance
tolerance to cold temperatures (Rank and Dahlhoff [2002]). Rank and Dahlhoff’s laboratory
experiments show that the homozygous PGI 1-1 genotype expresses heat shock proteins at a
lower temperature (reaching a peak of heat shock protein expression at 30° C) than the
homozygous PGI 4-4 genotype (reaching a peak of heat shock protein expression at 36° C), with
the heterozygous PGI 1-4 genotype expressing heat shock proteins at intermediate temperatures
(reaching a peak of heat shock protein expression at 33° C) (Rank and Dahlhoff [2002]).
Furthermore, when they exposed the beetles to extremely cold temperatures in the laboratory,
most of the female PGI 1-1 and 1-4 genotypes survived, but half of the female PGI 4-4
genotypes died (Rank and Dahlhoff [2002]).
These causal factors (the differing abilities of the different genotypes to survive hot and
cold temperatures) are consistent with the statistical data. That is, PGI 1-1 has the greatest ability
of the three genotypes to survive cold temperatures, and it is the genotype that is the most
prevalent in the coldest region; PGI 4-4 has the greatest ability to survive warmer temperatures,
and it is the most prevalent in the warmest region; and the heterozygote PGI 1-4 that does best at
intermediate temperatures is indeed the most prevalent in the intermediate region. It is important
to emphasize that the differing capabilities of the different beetle genotypes to survive differing
temperatures were determined in the laboratory, thus providing an independent line of evidence.
Moreover, as Rank and Dahlhoff ([2002], p. 2285) note, the laboratory results ‘suggest that
differences among Pgi genotypes in thermal physiology are responsible for Pgi allele frequency
                                                                                                                                                                                             
genetic variation and tracks them upwards to organisms living under natural conditions in order
to see how physiological differences play out in differences in reproductive success.
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change in nature.’ Thus, the causal data provide support for the claim that these populations are
undergoing natural selection by supplying a causal explanation for the observed statistical
pattern, lending credence to the claim that the pattern was not produced by some other means.
Rank and Dahlhoff’s studies are extensive and well done. They include at least three out
five components of Brandon’s ([1990], p. 165) ‘ideally complete adaptation explanations’: 1)
evidence that selection has acted on PGI genotypes (the statistical evidence, taken over a time
period); 2) an ecological explanation of why some PGI genotypes are better adapted than others
in different environments (they have identified, using Brandon’s terms, the selective agent as the
temperature and the adaptation as ‘ability to withstand heat or cold’); and 3) evidence that the
ability to withstand heat or cold is heritable.14 For what it’s worth, Rank and Dahlhoff also
discuss the underlying mechanism of heat and cold tolerance in the beetles; Brandon does ‘not
consider [a physiological or biomechanical explanation of mechanisms] a necessary part of the
evolutionary explanation of the adaptation’ (Brandon [1990], p. 166). However, it seems clear
that the ecological explanation needs to be enhanced; otherwise, how are we to be confident that
we have correctly identified the ‘selective agent’ and the ‘adaptation’? How do we know, for
example, that it only appears as if there is selection at the PGI locus, when in reality selection is
occurring at another, linked locus? We need either to perform a laboratory experiment to
demonstrate that the selective agent indeed acts on the phenotype in the way we think it does, or
                                                           
14 The fourth component is ‘information about the structure of the population from both a genetic
and a selective point of view, that is, information about patterns of gene flow and patterns of
selective environment’ and the fifth component is ‘phylogenetic information concerning what
has evolved from what’ (Brandon [1990], p. 165). With regard to the fourth component, Rank
and Dahlhoff indicate that the montane willow leaf beetle can be found in separated patches of
boggy or moist habitats, with limited migration between patches. This goes at least part of the
way towards satisfying the fourth component. They do not, to my knowledge, provide any
phylogenetic information about the beetle.
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we need to provide the underlying mechanism to show that the genotypes have the abilities that
we say that they do, or both. Rank and Dahlhoff do both; the laboratory experiment is described
above, and they explain that the different PGI genotypes’ differing abilities to withstand heat and
cold are the result of the production of differing amounts of heat shock protein at different
temperatures. This causal and mechanistic information, together with the other information
presented, provides strong evidence for Rank and Dahlhoff’s conclusions.
However, it should be noted that Rank and Dahlhoff’s research is ongoing, and it appears
to be complicated by the fact that the beetles acclimatize to different temperatures and by
differing responses from males and females of different ages. Nonetheless, two points emerge
clearly. First, finding a causal mechanism is a crucial piece of the natural selection story; the
statistical results are not sufficient on their own. Second, there seems to be a clear connection
between the differing temperatures, the amount of heat shock protein produced by the different
genotypes, and the subsequent survival ability of different genotypes. In other words, beetles that
have an enhanced ability to survive cold temperatures (via heat shock proteins) are selectively
favored in the northernmost region, whereas beetles that have an enhanced ability to survive
warm temperatures are selectively favored in the southernmost region.
The causal story is essential to understanding the statistical pattern. Moreover, if there
were no such causal differences present–if there were no differences in survival or reproductive
ability between the different genotypes–selection could not occur.15  Instead, the observed
patterns would be due to drift or some other evolutionary process. It is for this reason that natural
selection should be characterized as a discriminate sampling process whereby physical
                                                           
15 Of course, there may be differences in ability that we are unable to detect, but that is a
different issue.
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differences between organisms are causally relevant to differences in reproductive success. Drift,
by contrast, is an indiscriminate sampling process whereby physical differences between
organisms are causally irrelevant to differences in reproductive success (Millstein [2002],
[2005]).
4 The Montane Willow Leaf Beetle: A Population-Level Story
Even if I am correct that natural selection is a causal statistical process, rather than a purely
statistical one, the question remains as to whether causality acts at the population level or at the
individual level.
There are conflicting intuitions about this question. On the one hand, it might seem as
though natural selection is about individuals: their lives, their deaths, their reproductive
successes or failures. On the other hand, an oft-quoted, if not universally accepted passage from
Sterelny and Kitcher  ([1988], p. 345) suggests otherwise:
 In principle, we could relate the biography of each organism in the population,
explaining in full detail how it developed, reproduced, and survived, just as we could
track the motion of each molecule of a sample of gas. But evolutionary theory, like
statistical mechanics, has no use for such a fine grain of description: the aim is to make
clear the central tendencies in the history of evolving populations.
The first intuition runs into some immediate problems. Although it is true that these individual-
level causal events (living, dying, and reproducing) form the basis for natural selection, they do
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not constitute natural selection itself. Certainly, they do not constitute evolution by natural
selection. Definitions of evolution differ, but one common definition (at least among population
geneticists) is ‘change in gene frequencies from one generation to the next.’ ‘Gene frequency’ is
a property of a population–it refers to the percentage of individuals of each type within a
particular population. Moreover, although an individual organism’s properties may change over
the course of its lifetime–the organism may grow, change color, become stronger, even lose a
limb–it cannot be said to evolve. It is only populations that can evolve through a change in
genetic composition from one generation to the next.
The second intuition, however, is not unproblematic either. I agree with the spirit of
Sterelny and Kitcher’s quote, assuming ‘tendencies’ is meant in a causal sense, but its wording is
somewhat unfortunate. As Rosenberg ([1994], p. 62) notes, it is theorists who have aims, not
theories, which makes the population-level character of evolutionary theory sound purely
instrumental. However, as Rosenberg also notes, it is not clear that Sterelny and Kitcher intend
any such instrumentalism. Furthermore, the same essential point can be made by examining
evolutionary concepts and processes themselves, in additional to biological practice, as I will do
in this section.
I imagine that BR would remain unmoved by my concerns with the first intuition; they
have argued that we should ‘treat selection as a contingent causal process in which individual
fitness differences are the causes and subsequent population differences are the effects’ ([2004],
p. 710). To show that this claim does not hold up, I will again look to Rank and Dahlhoff’s
studies of the montane willow leaf beetle. As we have seen, these studies focus on the causes
inherent in selection–but are the selective processes acting on individual beetles or acting on
populations of beetles?
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In order to answer this question, we must first characterize what it means to say that
selection acts on individuals. However, there are at least two possible ways to do this, which I
will term ‘naïve individualism’ and ‘sophisticated individualism.’ BR, it should be noted,
endorse the sophisticated individualist position; however, an examination of the naïve position
(one I think is implicit in some accounts of natural selection) will highlight the importance of
what I call the comparative nature of natural selection. I will take up naïve individualism in
section 4.1 and sophisticated individualism in section 4.2.
4.1 Response to ‘Naïve Individualism’
On the naïve individualism view, it might be granted that, as a matter of practice,
evolutionary biologists focus on populations and characteristics of populations. However, the
naïve individualist asks whether biologists do this because that is where the real causal story is,
or because it is easier and more manageable. Ultimately, the naïve individualist believes that
natural selection is about the lives, deaths, and reproductive successes of individual organisms.
However, the naïve individualist points out that it would be overwhelming, time-consuming, and
expensive for biologists to try to observe, understand, and document each individual’s death or
reproductive success. On this view, then, biologists look at the general characteristics of
populations purely for practical reasons; their choice has nothing to do with the process of
natural selection itself. In principle, we could follow the life history of organisms and know what
caused them to survive long enough to reproduce or die before reproducing, just as we could (in
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principle) study the lungs of smokers throughout their lifetimes in order to determine whether
smoking was the cause of their lung cancer.16
However, the naïve individualist view does not succeed even given individualistic
assumptions because it falsely assumes that the natural selection case is like the smoking case.
Whereas we could (in principle) monitor an individual’s lungs to determine whether smoking
was the cause of her lung cancer, the best we could do (again, in principle) in the realm of
selective scenarios is to say whether an individual organism’s heritable physical characteristics
play a causal role in its survival and reproductive success. But this information would not allow
the individualist to determine whether the organism was selectively favored, selectively
disfavored, or subject to selection at all. An organism’s heritable physical characteristics might
cause it to survive long enough to reproduce, but if a second organism’s different heritable
physical characteristics cause it to have greater reproductive success than the first organism, the
first organism will not be selectively favored. Similarly, if organisms’ different physical
characteristics each cause reproductive success in the given environment such that their
reproductive successes are equal, neither of the organisms will be selectively favored over the
other. (Of course, the populationist would not grant that an individual organism could be
selectively favored over another individual organism; the point here is that naïve individualism
yields incorrect results even given individualist assumptions).
What this discussion shows is that you cannot follow the life history of one organism and
determine whether or not it has been selectively favored. That determination requires
                                                           
16 The position represented by this counter-argument might seem to be that of a determinist;
however, an indeterminist might take such a position as well, maintaining that we could follow
the causal influences on the organism even though those causes would not fully determine the
outcome.
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comparison with the other organisms in the population, whereas determining whether one
person’s smoking caused her lung cancer does not require comparison. Selection is a game
where what matters is how well you are able to do relative to others in the population, not how
well you are able to do in some absolute sense. To elaborate on this point, and to show how it
supports a population level account, let us consider three possible scenarios.
In the first scenario, a population consists of individuals all of the same genotype. In this
scenario, there would be no selection, since variation is a necessary condition for selection, as
has been acknowledged in every definition of selection from Darwin to the present day. Indeed,
without variation–without differences–there is nothing to select among.17 Thus, in his initial
study, Rank ([1992]) screened for polymorphism at twenty-two enzyme loci. However, only
seven of those were polymorphic. The remaining fifteen were not studied any further; they could
not exhibit selection because there was no variation for selection to act upon. Note that
‘variation’ is a property of a population, not an individual, manifested by organisms differing in
their heritable physical traits.
In the second scenario, a population consists of individuals of different genotypes, yet the
different genotypes are equal in their abilities to survive and reproduce. There will be no
selection in this scenario, either; again, it is universally acknowledged that selection requires
differences in abilities to survive and reproduce (what some would term ‘fitness differences’–I
                                                           
17 In this first scenario–indeed, throughout this essay–I am assuming that selection requires
heritable variation, a point on which there is a lack of universal agreement. (It is my belief that
selection without heritability is trivial–choosing which pen to use becomes an instance of
selection–but this is a digression that I will avoid here). Someone who does not hold that
selection requires heritable variation might argue that although the individuals are identical
genotypically, they differ phenotypically, and thus, there could be selection among the different
genotypes. However, note even on this view, variation is still a necessary condition; if there were
no phenotypic differences then there could be no selection.
Millstein, p. of 27 of  41
avoid the term to prevent entanglement in disputes over the definition of fitness), and yet under
this scenario, there are no such differences for selection to act on. A lack of significant
differences in genotype frequencies in a population can serve as evidence (although not
definitive evidence) for equal abilities to survive and reproduce. Thus, in the montane willow
leaf beetle studies, Rank, and subsequently Rank and Dahlhoff, rejected four of the seven
polymorphic loci as obvious candidates for selection18–there was variation at these loci, but
there were no significant differences in frequencies of the different genotypes and thus, no
obvious benefits conferred by being one genotype over another (although, of course, it is
possible that as a result of other factors such differences simply failed to manifest themselves, or
that the population had undergone selection to fixation in the past). Scenarios of this second type
illustrates that it doesn’t matter if a particular individual has a superb ability to survive and
reproduce–there will be no selection at all if other individuals who are physically different have
the same ability. In other words, it is one genotype’s ability to survive and reproduce relative to
other genotypes within the population that leads to selection.
In the third scenario, there are different genotypes, and the different genotypes differ in
their survival and reproductive abilities. In this scenario, selection can occur, acting on the
different abilities in the population. Differences in genotype frequencies can suggest (non-
definitively) that selection has occurred; this was the case with the PGI locus in the beetle
studies, and thus this was the locus that Rank and Dahlhoff chose to study in order to determine
if selection was in fact at work. That is, it was the locus that was the most promising, the one
whose polymorphism was most likely to have been the result of differing abilities. Indeed, as
                                                           
18 Two others were dropped ‘because the bands were not clearly readable for scoring of putative
genotypes’ (Rank [1992], p. 1099).
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discussed above, Rank and Dahlhoff sought to establish these differing abilities by exposing the
genotypes to different temperatures in the laboratory and measuring the production of heat shock
proteins. Had the different genotypes not produced differing amounts of heat shock protein, the
researchers would have been forced to look for other differences in abilities among the genotypes
or, if they failed to find any such, to conclude that there were no differences in abilities among
the genotypes (i.e., they would be forced to conclude that the second scenario had obtained and
that selection was not responsible for the observed variation). But differences in the production
of heat shock proteins were found (i.e., the third scenario obtained), providing the necessary
conditions for selection. Thus, in scenarios of this third type, there is the possibility for selection,
but only because of the ability of some genotypes as compared to the ability of other genotypes
within the population.
These three scenarios taken together describe the comparative nature of natural selection,
and its comparative nature entails that it is a population-level process. Natural selection requires
that some genotypes have a greater ability to survive and reproduce relative to other genotypes.
Otherwise, there is nothing for ‘nature’ to ‘select,’ or there is no basis on which ‘nature’ is able
to ‘select.’ An individual organism might have heritable traits that enable it to survive and
reproduce in its environment, but selection can occur only if there are differences in abilities in
the rest of the population. On the other hand, ‘variation in genotypes’ is a property of the
population, as is ‘variation in the abilities of genotypes.’ These population-level properties are
the causal engine of selection. This is causality at the population-level; the differing physical
abilities, an attribute of the population, do the causal work of selection.19
                                                           
19 Or, they do at least some of the causal work; below, I will describe a case that illustrates the
causal action of the environment on a population.
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In terms of the beetle case, we have selection when the differing production of heat shock
proteins by the different genotypes (yielding differing abilities to withstand hot and cold
temperatures) is causally relevant to differences in reproductive success among the genotypes.
Or, more generally, we have selection when heritable differences in physical characteristics
(yielding differences in survival and/or reproductive abilities) are causally relevant to differences
in reproductive success. In short, I have described a discriminate sampling process (Millstein
[2002]).
However, Matthen and Ariew seem to imply that sampling processes are at the
individual-level; Matthen and Ariew ([2002], p. 62) state: ‘And so one might think that one can
fix the exact role of vernacular fitness and of drift by looking more minutely at individual events
and determining when discriminate sampling has been at work, and when indiscriminate.’ But
this view is mistaken; ‘sampling’ implies a causal process that acts on a population.20 More
specifically, it is the process that acts on a population as a whole that determines whether the
sampling is discriminate or not.
To see why sampling is population-level, consider, for example, a redwood tree that is
killed as a result of a fire in which many, but not all, of the redwood trees in the forest were
killed. Consider two possible scenarios under which this could occur: 1) There is a heritable
physical characteristic of the tree in question that caused it to be killed; this characteristic is
shared by most of the other trees that were killed (and it caused their deaths as well). 2) There is
no heritable physical characteristic shared by the tree in question and most of the other trees that
                                                           
20 It might seem odd that I would find reason to disagree with Matthen and Ariew ([2002]) in this
section of the paper, given that, as I noted above, we agree that natural selection is a population-
level affair. But their characterization of sampling–a causal process–as individual-level rather
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were killed that is causally relevant to their death by forest fire. The first is discriminate
sampling; the second is indiscriminate sampling. And yet the causal process that acted on the
individual tree in question is the same in both scenarios: death by fire. There is no way we could
determine, by following the life history of the tree alone, whether it was killed by a discriminate
sampling process or an indiscriminate sampling process. But the point is more than epistemic;
there simply is no sampling process acting on the tree alone. Rather, there is a forest fire that acts
on the redwood population, either killing discriminately or killing indiscriminately. As Shapiro
and Sober ([forthcoming]) emphasize, ‘Sometimes [two individuals] x and y experience the same
token selection process because they causally interact; at other times they participate in the same
selection process because they are affected by a common token cause.’ Shapiro and Sober rightly
note that this is implicit in Darwin’s idea of the ‘struggle for existence,’ which encapsulates both
direct competition between individuals21 as well as cases such as a plant struggling on the edge
of a desert. With regard to the latter, Shapiro and Sober suggest that it is ‘entirely natural’ to
point to the drought as a single process affecting individual plants. My suggestion here is that it
is likewise ‘entirely natural’ to see the forest fire as a single process acting on the trees; together
with the fact that the action of that single process acts discriminately or indiscriminately only in
the context of the population as a whole (here again, we see the importance of the comparative
aspect of selection), it would seem that discriminate sampling, i.e., selection, is a population-
level process.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
than population-level enables them to overlook the fact that natural selection is a population-
level causal process.
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4.2 A Response to Sophisticated Individualism
However, my account of natural selection as fundamentally comparative raises the possibility of
a more sophisticated individualist counter-argument to my claim that natural selection is a
population-level process. Perhaps what needs to be done is not to follow the life history of
individual organisms (as the naïve individualist would have us do), but to perform pairwise
comparisons between individual organisms. BR espouse this view in a recent paper. According
to BR, organisms are compared two at a time in terms of their relative abilities to solve ‘design
problems’ in a given environment. Thus, their account is causal, takes into consideration the
comparative nature of natural selection, and yet preserves the individual-level account of
selection. Or, at least it purports to–it seems to me that their view collapses into the population-
level account, as I will show.
How would these pairwise comparisons proceed? BR do not tell us exactly how to do
this, so I will try to extrapolate from the assumptions of their account. BR state that we need to
consider ‘ecological fitness,’ where ‘a is fitter than b in [environment] E means that ‘a’s traits
result in its solving the design problems set by E more fully than b’s traits’ (Bouchard and
Rosenberg [2004], p. 699). And since we are comparing individuals, we would need to compare
each individual in the population, ‘taken one at a time,’ (Bouchard and Rosenberg [2004], p.
709) to every other individual at the population. For example, if a population had three
individuals, A, B, and C, we might begin by determining that A is better able to solve design
problems in the given environment than B (has greater ecological fitness), so we expect that A
                                                                                                                                                                                             
21 Indeed, where selection does involve such direct competition–whether it be males engaged in a
physical competition for females, or organisms competing for scarce resources–it becomes even
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will have more offspring than B. Next, we might determine that B has greater ecological fitness
than C (again, by comparing their abilities to solve design problems), so we expect B to have
more offspring than C.
Finally, we must compare A to C. In ‘transitive’ populations (a population where if A is
fitter than B and B is fitter than C, A will also be fitter than C) we can say that A is fitter C in this
environment; however, if A solves design problems through a different mechanism than C, A
may not be fitter than C in a future environment. Thus, in order to be able to make predictions
under conditions where the environment is changing, all of the individuals must be compared to
all of the other individuals. Given that BR intend ‘ecological fitness’ to be a qualitative, causal
determinant, and not just a quantitative ‘head count’ ([2004], p. 709), the latter comparison
seems to be a necessary step.
Indeed, the existence of ‘non-transitive’ populations highlights the absolute necessity of
comparing all of the individuals. Non-transitive populations can be compared to the children’s
game of ‘Rock, Paper, Scissors’ where rock crushes scissors, scissors cut paper, but paper covers
rock (Kerr et al. [2002]). In other words, none of the three is superior to the other two; each is
superior to one, but inferior to another. Kerr et al. ([2002]) study a population of Escherichia coli
that manifests this non-transitivity. The population contains three types of cells: 1) colicinogenic
cells (C), which are cells that can produce a toxin, colicin; 2) sensitive cells (S), which are cells
that can be killed by the colicin; and 3) resistant cells (R), which are immune to the colicin.
Under certain conditions, C is superior to S (the colicin released by the C cells kills the S cells),
but S is superior to R (because the mechanism that provides R with immunity from the colicin
hampers its nutrient uptake), while R can displace C (because the mechanism that allows C to
                                                                                                                                                                                             
harder to make the case for individual-level selection.
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release its toxin incurs a cost that hampers its growth rate). When C, S, and R are located in
‘clumps,’ or patches, this polymorphism can be maintained (however, in a ‘well-mixed’ system,
C drives S extinct and then R outcompetes C) (Kerr et al. [2002]). If one were only to compare,
for example, C to S and S to R, one would miss the relationship between C and R. 22
Thus, in general, for populations of N individuals, you would need to make (N)(N - 1)/2
comparisons, that is, enough comparisons so that each individual is compared to every other
individual in the population. As a practical matter, this would never be done, but in principle, so
the argument goes, it could be done.
After all the pairwise comparisons are completed, we must now determine which
individuals will be selectively favored and which individuals will be selectively disfavored. I
cannot see any way of doing this other than poring over the pairwise comparisons to establish a
complete ranking of individuals, as far as that can be done. That is, we would need to determine
which individuals are the best at solving design problems, which are the worst, and which are
intermediate. The reason for this is that, even though A may be ranked higher than B, both A and
B may be worse at solving design problems as compared to other individuals in the population,
and thus be selectively disfavored. Conversely, both may be selectively favored if they are better
at solving design problems as compared to other individuals in the population. We can imagine a
huge ranking of all the individuals in the population, with some ranked higher than others and
some ranked equally, and again, we would expect reproductive successes or failures accordingly.
Two points need to be emphasized here. First, philosophers often speak as though there
are only two genotypes in the population (or at best, three–two homozygotes and one
                                                           
22 Thanks to Patrick Forber for suggesting that the essay by Kerr et al. is relevant to my
arguments.
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heterozygote–but then it often turns out we have only two phenotypes to consider). Perhaps they
are following the simple models that can be found in the early chapters of introductory
population genetics textbooks, but we have to remember that biologists use these simple models
to make the mathematics more tractable, not as a reflection of biological reality. Skip to a later
chapter, and one finds comments such as the following:
There are often more than two alleles at one locus. Indeed, the recent surveys of enzyme
polymorphism…reveal many loci with 4 to 5, even 10 alleles (Roughgarden [1996], p.
101).
Indeed, in Rank and Dahlhoff’s study, there are more than two genotypes; Dahlhoff and Rank
identified eight genotypes at the PGI locus ([2000]), and the three genotypes that they focused on
each had a different phenotype (a different ability to withstand heat and cold). Now, to be fair, I
think that most philosophers recognize that the two-allele, one-locus model is a simplification;
what they fail to recognize is that the simplification causes them to overlook the comparative
nature of selection and its implications.
Second, the careful reader will note that throughout this paper I have used the terms
‘selectively favored’ and ‘selectively disfavored’ rather than the more common ‘selected for’ and
‘selected against.’ Once the comparative nature of selection is recognized along with the fact that
we are, more often than not, dealing with multiple genotypes, it becomes obvious that selection
is not a binary affair of ‘selected for’ or ‘not selected.’ Rather, some genotypes may be favored
as compared to other genotypes; but whether those genotypes are ultimately favored depends on
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the composition of the population at large (again, because a third, fourth, or fifth genotype may
be more successful than either of the first two).23
Perhaps I have misunderstood how the pairwise comparisons are supposed to work, but it
would seem that this collection of individuals, with some individuals ranked higher than other
individuals, is a population. If in the end, the real selective story is known only when all the
pairwise comparisons have been done and the ranking completed, then any given pairwise
comparison is superfluous–it is only an intermediate step that leads to the real selective story at
the population level. Or, to put the point another way, if you do not establish the rankings, then
you do not know which individuals are selectively favored. But once you do establish the
rankings, you are no longer dealing with individuals; you are dealing with a population.24
Moreover, of those individuals who are ranked equally, some will solve design problems
in the same way, and some may solve design problems in a different way (but have the same
ability to survive and reproduce). As noted above, it would be important to distinguish these two
groups because if the environment changes, these groups may no longer have the same ability to
survive and reproduce. In other words, it would be crucial to know the different genotypes in the
population, and not just which individuals had equal abilities in the given environment. Thus, the
rankings obtained should be rankings of the genotypes in the population, and indeed, this is what
                                                           
23 Perhaps an even better alternative is to distinguish between genotypes (or genes) that increase
in frequency and genotypes (or genes) that decrease in frequency; Hartl and Clark  ([1989], p.
169) note that ‘an allele will increase in frequency provided its marginal fitness exceeds the
mean fitness of a population.’ Geometric mean fitness is, of course, a characteristic of the
population rather than of any given individual; this too is evidence that selection operates at the
population-level.
24 Furthermore, as Elliott Sober has suggested ([personal communication]), if you compared the
fitnesses of all individuals with each other, you would thereby discover the fitness ordering of
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Rank and Dahlhoff provide us, for each of the microclimates under study. The end result seems
to be that pairwise comparisons end up dealing with populations and population parameters (but,
of course, the long way around; even the ‘Rock, Paper, Scissors’ study was not done by
comparing every individual to ever other individual). The individual-level account collapses into
the population-level account.25 The conclusion to be drawn is that natural selection is a causal
process that operates at the level of populations.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that natural selection must be understood as a causal process
operating at the population level. First, even though population-level causation may be
controversial in some circles, it is no more problematic for selection in general than it is for
frequency-dependent selection in particular, a widely-accepted and well-documented biological
phenomenon. Moreover, population-level causation in natural selection can be understood in
terms of a number of popular contemporary accounts of causation. Second, statistics alone are
insufficient to capture natural selection, as my discussion of Rank and Dahlhoff’s studies of the
montane willow leaf beetle showed; the initial statistical results were compatible with either
natural selection or random drift. Thus, as a theoretical matter, causality is a necessary
component of natural selection; furthermore, good biological practice seeks out the causal basis
                                                                                                                                                                                             
different trait combinations, but not necessarily of single traits. The approach of ranking
genotypes, on the other hand, allows one to isolate the differences made by a single trait, if any.
25 There is a further concern with BR’s account. In order to distinguish selection from drift, they
suggest that with selection, there is a random distribution of initial conditions, and that drift
comes into play when this distribution is non-random. However, distribution of initial conditions
Millstein, p. of 37 of  41
for selection claims. Third, causation in natural selection operates at the population-level, as the
beetle studies also illustrate, because of the inherently comparative nature of the selection
process. Again, there is no way to make sense of selecting for an individual if selection is
determined only by what is happening in the population as a whole. Attempts at capturing
selection as an individual-level causal process collapse into a population-level account.
Of course, none of this is to deny that populations are composed of individuals or that
causes are acting on those individuals. Nor is it to deny that individual-level causal events
(living, dying, and reproducing) are in some sense responsible for selection. What I deny is that
such individual-level causal events constitute the selection process itself. A long beak might be
causally relevant to the survival (and ultimately, reproduction) of a particular finch because it
allows the finch to feed on a particular type of seed. However, in one population, that type of
organism might be selectively favored, whereas in a different population, that type would be
selectively disfavored, and in a third, it might not be selected at all. Furthermore, we can sum up
the number of finches who survived because of their long beaks and the number of finches with
shorter beaks who perished without reproducing (or who produced fewer offspring). But this is
just to assert that some individuals live and reproduce prodigiously and some do not. If that had
been all that there was to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, not only would it not have been
controversial, it would not have been given any attention at all, because it would have expressed
a triviality. One of the things that makes the theory non-trivial is the invocation of its causal
basis; a causal basis that, properly understood, is not comprised of the causes acting on
individuals, but instead is comprised of the causes that act on the population as a whole: the
                                                                                                                                                                                             
is a property that occurs across a population, not a property of an individual. Thus, once again
BR’s account collapses into a population level account.
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relative physical differences between genotypes in the population that yield differing relative
abilities to survive and reproduce. And that is just to reassert what I have argued throughout:
natural selection is neither a purely statistical (acausal) population-level summation, nor is it a
process of individual-level causation. Natural selection is, properly understood, a process that
exhibits population-level causation.
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